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Abstract 
Mennonites and Quakers have histori- 
cally renounced the use of violence for 
resolving conflicts. From 1994 to 1997 
the Mennonite Central Committee 
(MCC) ran a program of civilian peace- 
making in Burundi at the request of lo- 
cal Quakers. Their goals were modest, 
hoping that international volunteers 
could assist in reducing the level of vio- 
lence and creating space for positive 
things to happen. Lessons learned were 
discussed at a seminar hosted by the 
Quaker United Nations O f i e  in Ge- 
neva in  May 1997. 
Historiquement, les Mennonites et les 
Quakers ont abandonnt le recours h la 
violence duns la rtsolution des conflits. 
Entre 1994 et 1997 le Comitt Central 
Mennonite a pilott u n  programme de 
pacification civile au Burundi h la de- 
mande des Quakers locaux. Leurs objec- 
tifs ttaien t modes tes et se fondaien t sur 
I'espoir que des volon taires internatio- 
naux pourrait contribuer ri une rtduc- 
tion d u  niveau de violence et  ri la 
constitution d'un espace pemzettant la 
rtalisa tion d 'actions positives. Les le- 
cons tirtes de cette exptriencefurent 
discuttes lors d'un Sh ina i re  tenu par 
le Bureau Quaker des Nations Unies ri 
Gen2ve en mai 1997. 
In late 1994 Burundi Quakers invited 
the Mennonite Central Committee 
(MCC) to send international volun- 
teers to Burundi. What is the role of 
international agencies in such a setting 
of conflict? 
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Amongst other things, the MCC fa- 
cilitated unarmed outside interven- 
tions, encouraged dialogue amongst 
church leaders, planned regional train- 
ing in conflict resolution, developed 
nonviolence materials in Kirundi, and 
organized trauma healing workshops. 
The program coordinators were re- 
sponsible for supervising volunteers 
who came for six month periods to be 
a peace presence amongst threatened 
communities. The volunteers were not 
chosen for their particular skills or 
training; their mere presence was con- 
sidered more important than their ac- 
tivities. They received no special 
training. Most were in their twenties. 
Most lived in rural locations with 
Burundian people (usually Hutu) and 
with access to a vehicle. There were few 
administrative and backup structures. 
In May 1997, the Quaker Office in 
Geneva organized a workshop to dis- 
cuss the MCC program in Burundi 
with UN agencies and Non-Govern- 
mental Organizations. The following 
issues were highlighted: 
Objectives 
To reduce the level of violence (i.e., 
perhaps by "shaming") through the 
presence of individuals. 
To encourage dialogue and under- 
standing at the grassroots level, by 
bringing people together for spe- 
cific activities. 
To "create space" for something 
positive to happen. 
To accompany individuals who felt 
vulnerable so they could carry on 
with their own activities 
There was no attempt to create abuffer 
zone between communities and to 
monitor or document human rights 
violations. 
Arnbiguities/Dilemmas 
Should those in conflict be brought 
together, or should they be kept 
apart? 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
both "stand with" people and 
document human rights violations; 
What should be done with evidence 
of human rights violations? 
Should those intervening maintain 
a low or a high profile? 
Positive Impacts of Presence 
The presence of individuals: 
ficilitated meetings with authori- 
ties, e;g. visits to jails, getting 
through checkpoints; 
established communication with 
military personnel at local level, 
building trust; 
promoted inter-ethnic dialogue, 
e.g. through conflict resolution 
seminars; 
established an inter-ethnic peace 
committee in one local community; 
initiated volleyball games between 
Tutsi soldiers and Hutu civilians; 
and 
helped to share Burundi experi- 
ences with the outside world. 
Negative Impacts of Presence 
Some people were seen as benefit- 
ing more and resentment arose. 
Some regarded the volunteers with 
suspicion, especially those without 
a specific activity/job (there was 
one nurse); rumours arose that they 
were mercenaries. 
Their presence attracted criminal 
elements, assuming they had mate- 
rial goods. 
Their presence and association 
with Burundians could lead to 
greater threats or targeting after 
they left the country. 
They were helping the most vulner- 
able but were never confronting the 
belligerents. 
Their presence gave vulnerable 
people the confidence to take risks 
they perhaps should not have. 
Their presence perpetuated stere- 
otypes, namely that the lives of out- 
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siders were more valuable than 
those of local people. 
Some people resented their pres- 
ence, thinking that Burundi prob- 
lems should be solved by 
Burundians ("Leave Burundi for 
Burundians"). 
Limitations 
Insecurity increased, especially 
against expatriates. 
Expatriates increasingly attracted 
negative attention. 
The Burundian Quaker Church 
was unable to provide continued 
support, and some Burundian 
Quakers had to flee the country. 
The MCC was perceived as pro- 
Hutu, because most volunteers 
worked or lived with Hutus. 
Grassroots work could notbe really 
effective when the problem was at a 
national, political level. 
Timing-what might be appropri- 
ate at one point may not be at an- 
other. 
UN missions are limited by their 
inability to obtain clearance from 
UN and local authorities to move 
about the country because of secu- 
rity concerns-this affects the ex- 
tensiveness of their work. 
What Could be Done Differently 
More planning is required regard- 
ing goals, strategies, and training. 
Necessary administrative struc- 
tures must be in place, with requi- 
site financial resources. 
Those participating need emotional 
support; there is no such thing as a 
"low maintenance" person. 
Maintain a creative balance be- 
tween short and long term involve- 
ment-6 months might be 
insufficient but the tension of the 
situation and burnout are very real 
problems. 
More balanced presence with both 
Hutus and Tutsis is required. 
Try to have Burundian Tutsi and 
Hutu advisors for such a program. 
Other Lessons (Open Discussion) 
Outsiders need to be aware of the work 
at different "levels": 
There is a need to work with local 
people and build on local capacity; 
a willingness to "suffer with" and 
to be more closely linked to local 
structures. 
Many small, local initiatives lack 
support, e.g. peace-making manu- 
als, training, finances. 
There could be more in-country, 
inter-agency dialogue on peace- 
making (not simply on humanitar- 
ian issues and relief). 
There could be more support for the 
International Tribunals, aimed at 
creating a climate of justice. 
There must be political pressures 
and dialogue at national, regional 
and international level. 
Outsiders must: 
have experience, maturity and sin- 
cerity (local language skills also 
important, e.g. Kirundi); 
have modest objectives, and be 
modest about what can be done; 
build trust, while being aware of 
extensive mistrust. 
Further, 
impartiality is important for build- 
ing trust, but is difficult to achieve 
in practice; and 
there will always be ambiguities 
and dilemmas; it is important to 
remain aware of these. 
Who Should Do Peace-making 
Work 
Leave Burundi for Burundians? 
No, there is a role for outsiders 
within certain parameters. 
Civilian peace-making interven- 
tions cost much less than military 
peace-making (e.g., Blue Helmets). 
Should UN agencies have a peace- 
making mandate; should it be 
"mainstreamed" within their pro- 
gramming? (e.g., staff training in 
conflict transformation, programs 
for conflict transformation and 
peace education) 
Can UN agencies do peace-making 
work through "humanitarian ob- 
servers" or "White Helmets"? 
Should peace-making be done pri- 
marily by organizations which spe- 
cialize in this (e.g., NGOs)? w 
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